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Bryan WILSoN
Religious belonging is one of tbe primary agencies in terms of which
men may affirm tbeir identity. It funetioned more fully in this way when
mankind was divided into small, local units, eacb with its own claim to access
to supernatural protectors of its own. Rut although its role has diminished,
even under the impact of dic stronger social ties welded by nationalism, it
has not entirely lost its capacity to confer identity, and in contemporary
multi-cultural societies it sometimes plays a significant role. lb set tbe scene,
1 turn first to a consideration of bow religion has funetioned to affirm
identity in earlier phases of social development, before discussing its
contemporary performance of tbis funetion.
In tribal society, religion was a group property, and this was perhaps no
less dic case in communal societies newly-evolved from tribalism (classieal
Greece, for example). In those societies religion funetioned as what might
be called an unconscious group ideology. Religion legitimized group identity
and group-belonging by conferring on the community a claim to
metaphysical origin and status. Ibe group was said to be created by, or
chosen by, and was most emphatically protected by its own deity or deities.
Wben groups, tribes. or Greek city states fougbt eacb other, the conquerors
made it tbeir first task to desecrate the shrines of the gods of tbose whom
[bey liad defeated. In this way they emasculated (ir at least demoralized
their adversaries —mucb as warriors in much later ages continued to
endeavour to capture tbe banner or the flag of an enemy. In such societies,
religion was the ultimate point of reference by whicb a group affirmed its
identity, declared its independent existenee, claimed its origins, and
proclaimed its destiny. A supernatural dimension was in this way
incorporated into social life. and etbnicity and locality bad conferred upon
them supramundane significance.
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Tribal religion of this kind was unsopbisticated, lacking anytbing
resembling coherent teaching. It was essentially a matter of collective
practice. Its social functions were latent and unperceived, but it augmented
the sense of cobesion of the group and it validated group purposes and
activities. Ihe appeal to its own special deities, [o the group’s ancestors, or
to spirits identified witb particular local pbysical features important in dic
group’s environment, provided the ultimate point of reference for the
community. By this means, the group took cognizance of itself and projected
itself in relation to both nature and to other neigbbouring communities and
peoples.
Although tribal societies generally made no conscious distinction
beween dic categories of natural and supernatural phenomena, mine dic
less, virtually alí such peoples maintained this kind of supernaturalist
interpretation of their misan d’etre. That they did so, indicates that, at least
in carlier stages of social evolution, sucb invocation of the supernatural on
behalf of the entire community fulfilled a funetion which appears to have
been indispensable in expressing what bound them together. What is also
apparent is that just as tribes or groups were often in conflict with one
another, so their religions were also generally seen as mutually antagonistie
ané inappropriate for anyone outside dic bounds of dic group ilseliL In ibis
sense, religion marked a non-geographic but none the less vital social
frontier. lf religion was one of [he terms which identified those wbo
belonged to the same social group, it also made clear tbose who were
excluded. Religion legitimized the divisions and the differences. and
established social if not terrestrial frontiers.
For a cogent example of ah [bis, we may turn to the Oíd Testament.
There we have a long historical account of the struggle of the Israelites
against a variety of enemies, and numerous invocations of tbeir god to
protect them and to figbt with them. Tbeirprimary struggle, of course, was
against other peoples who constituted their external enemies. Tbere was,
bowever, also a secondary struggle. And that was to maintain [heir own
separate identity distincí from that of those indigenous tilbes ‘whose land
they had invaded. To legitimize tbeir invasion and [heir eontinuing military
struggle for dominance, they maintained the fiction that the land had been
promised [o tbem by [heir god —they claimed tobe a chosen people. Israel
was a confederacy of [ribes, held together by a covenant witb their god—
an oath-bound confederation wbicb lacked, over long periods, permanent
central political institutions. a “culí league” as Max Weber called it.’ Yet,
despite ibis solemn covenaní, as settlers they were vulnerable lo co-oplalion
into tbe pervasive culture of the indigenous peoples. As pastoralists, living
among tribes some of whom were nomadic, tbe need for boundaries of other
tban a strictly geographic kind was perhaps alí [he more imperative. A
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shared common religion was, we must suppose, an agency whieh reinforced
the sense of identity; it provided ideological boundaries; and it reaffirmed
group distinctiveness. At numereus points, the prophets warned Israel
against adopting the heathen customs of the other peoples alongside whom
[bey lived. Religion became [he hallmark of tbeir identity. In a situation
where there was no possibility of establisbing physical frontiers, a people
conscíous of its distinctive status, affirmed its identity by following mores
tbat they held to constitute a divine command morality explicitlyprescribed
by [heir deity. In bis name, they indicted many of the customs of the
indigenous peoples.
One conspicuous moral interdiction has persisted as part of tbe Judale
legacy to Christian morality, even though its funetion as a distinguishing
taboo has now been lost. This was [he rigorous prohibition of homosexual
behaviour. Religiously sanetioned sodomy, perbaps with male temple
prostitutes,was a conspicuous and distinetive practice of [he Canaanites. In
response, tbe Israelites developed [he strongest interdiction of homosexual
behaviour. The general explanation for [he vigour with whicb the Israelites
propounded [bis taboo, lies in the contrast that it established with [he
religiously-prescribed customs of neighbouring peoples. Their stern and oft-
reiterated indictment of sodomy funclioned to establish firm boundaries
between [he Israelites and the despised indigenous peoples of Palestine.
lnheriting [his strong moral proscription from Judaism, Christianity also for
some time found it useful as a putative boundary marker between God’s
people and others. In [be Middle Ages, [bose perceived as inadequate
Chris[ians, namely heretics such as tbe Albigensians. from whom [he faithful
were rigorously to separate themselves, were regularly also accused of [he
unnatural vice of sodomy. The religious frontier of special identity was thus
given a powerful moral dimension.
As the repository of group rituals, customs, and values, religion functioned
to sustain social cohesion by reinforcing [he shared orien[ations of the group.
Religion legitimized authority within society. It was invoked [o endorse sucb
group policies as embarking on warfare; suingfor peace; cementing alliances.
Tbe regulations governing what should be hunted or planted, and [he
approved means, times, seasons and places for bunting, for sowing and reaping
were supported, or perhaps initiated in patterns of religiously prescribed
order. Judeo-Christian religion, in particular then, became dic anchorage for
moral dispositions cultivated by a system of injunctions and restraints, but
generally tbe affirmation of group identity was a matter intimately concerned
with [be collective security of tbe whole community. Social control depended
on [he tbreat tbat supernatural sanctions would be incurred for infractions
of [he moral code. Maintenance of [he rules was frequently felt tobe essential
[o avert the wratb of the gods, and [be group itself might apply what has been
called ~‘public hygiene” against [he dangerous man wbose unsanetioned
conduct might put the well-being of the group a[ risk.
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Societies which evolved a more encompassing political apparatus may
bave been less dependent on tbe distinctiveness of their religion [o augment
[heir sense of identity. None dic less, in certain circumstances, religion might
still be [he defining agency for a separated community. In no instance was
[his more dramatically dic case [han di the emergence of Christianity.
Although beginning as a sect witbin Judaism, from very early days the new
faith began [o gather a following which separated itself from others, and
claimed for itself a distinctive, implicitly elite status. Sucli were [he
transcendent claims of the early Christians that they demanded exemption
from the laws and obligations of subjects of the Roman statc within which
they lived. Paul contended against the narrower conceptions of Peter and
the Jerusalem Cbristians, who saw Christianity as essentially a Jewish scct,
bound by [he ritual requirements of .ludaism. and be made dic universalistic
proclamation tbat Christians were neither bond nor free, Greek nor Jew.
1-lis pronouncement was a claim [o a voluntarily assumed identity which
paralleled, but which also transcended, [he etbnic, linguistic, political, and
imperial bonds of allegiance whieh prevailed in [be contemporary Roman
world. Wbat Christianity offered was a new foundation for identity, a new,
non-etbnic, essentially voluntary ideological basis in terms of which to claim
affiliations which in tbeir compelling nature far exceeded tbe involuntary
bonds of blood, family, clan, tribal. orsucb conceptions of national identitv
as [ben existed. Civen the social status of [be early Cbristian converts, many
of whom appear to have been siaves, migrants, or displaced persons, [his
was. perhaps, [he only basis on wbich [he new religion could establish itself
lf it were [o survive, it was necessary for it to outbid alí other claims to
allegiance, and toestablisb firmly that adberents of [he newfaith were first
and foremost Cbristians, wbatever else they might have been or, in a residual
sense. migbt still be. The viability of Christianity depended on the creation
of a new community in whicb alí other ethnic attributes or political loyalties
were at least subordinated and perbaps relinquished. Gradually, Christianity
evolved a quasi-political structure of a new type which affirmed
organizationally [he identity of its participants. and established a frontier
between Christians and pagans. As a congregational institution, [he church
may have been modelled on [he synagogue, affording regular and frequcnt
association of bclievers, but unlike the synagogue, it was open to al! who
made [he ideological commitment to participate. Thus it reinforced shared
belief by regular association and a more formal pattern of a[tachment,
commitment no[ only to [he new faith but also [o [he church structurc and
to [he religious community as sucb.
lnitially, Christianity required a conscious and deliberate act of
commitment on the part of adherents, and notionally this requircment
persisted in ensuing centuries. In the very early period of its bistory,
Christian belief could not be an inherited obligation. Christians chose to
be such. They created [heir own fron[iers vis-a-vis tbe wider population,
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andcelebrated their own separate identity. Persecution in [he early centuries
undoubtedly reinforced that sense of separation. But that might be seen as
a purely adventitious factor. Even without it, Christians forged a distinctive
identity of tbeir own. Indeed, it was [beir determination to erect a barrier
between themselves and the rest of the Roman world, in persistently
refusing [o incorporate in their worsbip reverence to [he Roman emperor,
that induced [he intermittent persecution to whieh they were subjected.
‘l’wo faetors combined in Cbristianity to present a tbreat to [beir pagan
contemporaries. First tbere was tbe insistent exclusivism of Christians. And
second, there was [be strong Christian commitment [o proselytize. Christian
exclusivism demanded [bat aH other beliefs be rejected as false and inimical,
and [herefore that converts should abandon alí other religious affiliations.
The Roman authorities migbt bave tolerated a measure of exelusivisin sueh
as they tolerated for [be Jews, but, in general, the .Jews did not seek to
convert outsiders, and eventually [bey came slrongly to re-affirm [bat their
religion was essentially ethnically-based. Christianity was clearly more
dangerous. It looked actively for converts and it claimed not merely to be
dic religion for a chosen people. such as was claimed for Judaism by Jews.
but also declared itself to be the only true religion for alí mankind. Tbus,
in [heir reaction [o Christians. [he external authorities reinforced [be
Church’s own predisposition to establisb a frontier between itself and the
non-Christian world. Such was tbe transcendent claim made for Cbristian
faith, that tbis frontier alone was tobe inviolate. AII other boundaries were
tobe set aside. as [he Christian affirmed his paramount identity in terms of
the religious commitment tbat be had espoused.
The subsequent coalition of Cburch and State, begínning with
Constantine and continuing as [he norm for Christian Europe, saw [he loss
of [he pre-eminence of religion as [he basis br social identity. As political
agencies were reformulated and with the eventual emergence of state
societies, religion was br a long period generally relegated [o a subsidiary
role in [he affirmation of identity. AI[hougb the Cburcb continued [o lay
claim [o primacy in mobilizino loyalties. in practice, political entities were
generally more effective in commanding the allegiance of the people witbin
[beir now geograpbically-based territories. Only when some superordinate
cause, sucb as the cali [o defend [he Holy Land whicb lcd to tbe Crusades,
was religion able [o claim primacy over narrower, more localized, political
loyalties, and then only uncertainly. At times, indeed, tbe Church became
a mere pawn in the political game, as monarchs sponsored rival papal
claimants and used tbem in [heir power struggles. Notionally, pre-
Reformation Europe was religiously unified, and Christianity had only a
very generalized role asan agency eonferring identity on [he people at large.
None [be less, at local level, religious sources were frequently invoked to
sustain group rivalries and to affirm group identity. Village patron saints
were no[ uncommonly set over against each other, partieularly wben
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miracles and visions were claimed simultaneously by parishes which sought
to compete for [he profits that were available [o those churches wbich
became centres of pilgrimage. Reninants of dic same tendency may silí be
found — br example, in Malta the rivalry between neighbouring parishes
in [he promotion of village jestas, sometimes involves clainis to the
superiority of one saint over another — Our Lady of Lourdes rnay be
claimed by the parishioners of one village tobe more virginal that OurLady
of Fatima [o whom [he church of a neigbbouring parish is dedicated.
Once, however, [he apparent religious conformity of mediaeval times
was breached at the Reformation, religion again emerged with dic potential
at least to re i nforce poli t cal ident ity. The principal of cuias regio, cuias
religio wbich was established at dic Peace of Augsburg in 1555. made
religious divergence a premiss on which distinetive principality. national,
or political identity could once again be underwrittcn. State churches
celebrated in religious terms [he claimed political identity of a people. Such
was [he strength which [he particular national agencies of Christianity
acquired [bat. following thc transplanting of Europeans lo [he tinited States
in the ninetcentli century, many of [he Protestant churches continued as
separate national entities, designated as, for example. the Swedish Lutheran
Church, dic (jerman Lutheran Church, or [be Norwegian Lutheran Church.
A national sense of identity was bere reinforced by, but in these instances
also transcended. religious divisions, and even a religion which ah shared
in common. was not strong enough to provide a sense of shared identitv
which overrode national, linguistic, and cultural bases of identification.
Olficial Protestantism adapted more lully [o thc political demands of
different states [han did Roman Catholicism. which, at least at the higber
level of its own hierarchy, did so [o a very much smaller extent Yet. in
cultural temis. the case was not entirely different, as the evidence, again
from the American so-called “melting pot’. makes clear. There the Catholic
church was dominated first Uy dic lrish immigrants, then Uy [he ltalians,
and later by the Poles. Thus each ncwly arriving group found that the church
[o whicb thev had belonged was. here in America, under quite alien control
which was for tbem far from congenial. It was this circumstance which lcd
[o [he emergence of the Polish National Catholie Church as a schismatic
body in [he United States. as a protesí against [he dominance of Caiholies
of a different nationality and culture. The consequences wcre even more
profound when [he Puerto Rican inimigrants emerged in the country in [he
l950s and 1960s. Accustomed as [bey were, at borne, lo a much more
communahly based structure of Catholicisrn . they were doubly alienated
from [he version of Catbolicism which thev cncountered in tbe United
Sta[es. 1-bey reacted against both the institutionalized charaeter of the
Ronian Cburcb in the States. and against what was for them thc foreign
character [bat had been imposed upon it Uy carlier immigrants. Seeking [be
reassurance of tbc type of small supportive local groups which Ihe Catholic
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cburch had provided for tbem at bome. many Puerto Ricans ímmigrants
abandoned Catbolicism in favour of Penteeostalism which was more
immediately responsive to their needs2. Tbus. in tbese circumstances,
religion was less powerful asan agency of boundary-maintenance [ban were
the stronger ties of inherited common culture and the bonds of national
and linguistic identity. But religion became [he vehicle througb wbicb tbat
sense of separate cultural, if not national identity might be expressed and
sustained.
lf we retura to cari>’ Reformation Europe, it is clear [bat the nascent
nation states and the minor principalities found in religion a support for
their claims to sovereignty. The legitiniation wbich religion provided for
secular rulers was still sought, even if. as was typically tbe case in Protestant
countries, church authorities were certainly politically subordinate; witb
appointments effectively made, not by a church hierarchy, but by [he política?
powers tbemselves. Religion was invoked to augment and consolidate [he
claims to legitiinate authority for [he constitution and [he polity. Did the
remit of religion go further? Tbe wars of the seventeentb eentury, in
continental Europe and in Britain, are sometimes represented as religious
wars, and certainly the rhetoric in terms of which tbey were fougbt was
religious. Religion was at least still a legitimatingforce,justifying war as well
as less dramatie acts of policy. One may doubt wbether it established
frontiers: at besí, it functioned to make political frontiers more impermeable.
One sees [bat, regarding religion, monarchs were capable of considerable
cynicism. The examples are numerous. [bus, one of [he (jrand Dukes of
Lithuania, atan carlier date, made a conscious and purely expedient political
choice bctween Orthodox and Catholic versions of Christianity Henry VIII
of England, having written vigorously against Lutber and baving had
conferred upon him by the pope. the titie of Defender of tite Faith, turned
Protestant at least in part because be wisbed to divorce bis Aragonese wife.
And Henry IV of France was a Protestant wbo became turncoat in order to
beconie king of France, saying that Paris was “worth a mass
Tbere was a general assumption among the political autborities in
Europe. that one of the vital funetions of religion was to reinforce social
cohesion witbin a societv. Dissent was seen not merely as a matter of
religious deviation, but potentially as a source of disruption for [be society
as a whole. Religious consensus was generally believed essential for social
cobesion and national security. It was in response to tbis assumption tbat
[he state persecuted dissenters and sought [o execute or expel tbem. The
Cburcb itself had warranted such treatment, expressed vigorously Uy
Thomas Aquinas. wbo wrote:
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“In regard to heretics... there is their sin, by which they have deserved
not only te be separated from the Church, but te be eliminated from
the world by death. [ter it isa graver matter te corrupt the faith which
is [he life of the soul than to falsify money which sustains temporal life.
So it it be just [bat forgers and malefaclois are pul lo death without
mercy by the secular authorities, with how much greater reason may
heretics be not only cxcommunicated bat also be put to death. when
once they are convicted of heresy. Qn the part of Ihe Church [here is
merciful hope of conversion of [bose in error [butj if tbe heretic rernains
pertinacious. [he Church. despairing of bis conversion. makes provision
for [he safety of others, and separating him by [he sentence of
exconimunication fron [he Church. passes blm te secular judgement
tobe exterminated frem this world bv deatl0
Sucb bostility towards religious dissenters was not confined [o Catholic
countries, although it was most pronounced there. The persecution of
Anabaptists in [be l-loly Reman Empire was typical. while [be massacre,
on St. Bartholomew’s Eve, 1572, of French Protestants remains perhaps
unparalleled among Christians as a cynical aet by which one group made
manifest its hostility towards another group of Cbristians. In England.
Catholics were objccts of suspicion, particularly because of tbe fear that
thcy migbt act in [he interests of Spain, and br centuries any Jesuit wbo
was discovered was notionally subject to sentence of death as a suspected
enemy of tbe state.
Tbe European state evolved as a partnersbip with tbe Church, with [he
state notionally subordinate in Catholic countries, but everywhere the
relations were close. In the seventeenth century. Archbisbop Laud in
England pursued an aggressive policy towards dissenters wbich was partially
responsible for [heir rising against both Church and State in the Civil War.
His contemporary, Cardinal Riehelieu, as head of governmcnt in France,
pursued a policy of reinforcing [he power of tbe Cburcb, and took as his
mission [be elimination of [he Protestant minority wbich was, at [bat time,
well enseonced in parts of soutbern and western France. Bishops continued
to be drawn predominantly ib not exclusively from [he ruling classes in
various European countries certainly until [be end of [be eighteenth century
and sometimes later. Nation and religion were sewn together. and religion
continued tobe invoked [o provide a strong support of national identity
The strong belief that religious consensus produced, or at lcast sustained,
social cohesion was first cballenged by the development of the United States
of America. Here was a country [be citizens of whicb were drawn from
various cultures ané diverse religicus persuasions. Furtbermore, many of
[hose who had ernigrated to America were religious refugees, seeking to
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escape [he oppressive regimes of Europe where men were coerced into
religious conformity. flere were Puritans in Massachusetts, Baptists in
Rhode Island, Quakers in Pennsylvania, Catbolics in Maryland, and, sooner
or later, a variety of German and Dutcb sects — Pietists, Anabaptists,
Nioravian Bretbren, Mennonites, among others — scattered in various
states, as well as tbose who were not refugees, Anglicans in large part, in
states such as Virginia. Clearly, u tbe varíous states were [o form a stable
federation, and bence one new world society, religious toleration and not
religious consensus must become tbe basis of social cohesion. In a sense,
[he Americans discovered a higber principie than that of religious
conformity. Tbey perceived [bat a principIe of toleration was the only basis
on which so diverse a new nation could possibly hold together. The
alternative was [he prospect of constant division and perbaps social conflict.
‘[bat inevitable conclusion implied, of coerse, dic relativizing of religion.
It suggested that [here was a principIe that stood higber than the truths
proclaimed by any one religion, namely the demand for toleranee. Religious
pluralism became [he new norm, and toleration tbe key principie for the
new type of state being forged in North America. It was, of course, also a
massive concession to secularization, since in [be interests of equality of alí
religions, [he state had necessarily [o be a secular state — [he first secular
state. Thus, in [he American case. religion was superseded asan agency for
[he type of boundary-maintenance whicb it had reinforced betwecn
Furopean countries. It ceased [o mark significant political frontiers, even
thougb it continued [o funetion in [be lesser role of marking [he cultural
boundaries between different social groups within the eountry The creation
of a state based on toleration relegated eacb specifie faith to a subordinate
sphere, and created in America what has beeíi called, foliowing Rousseau,
“civil religion”,~ [bat is, faitb in a bigber abstraet principIe of justice
transcending [he particularities of each separate religious denomination.
[bus it was [bat Will Herberg could write that, within tbe tolerant American
context. Catbolicism, Protestantism, and Judaism ah expressed both
American identity and a common commitment to etbical ideals [bat were
embodied in [he ultimate authority of tbe state, and whicb surpassed the
specific moral demanás of any religion.
In relativizing ah rehigion, [he pluralism whicb became the norm in
America wcnt further than tIte measure of pluralism and toleration whicb
had carlier prevailed as a limited concession in other parts of [be world.
Toleration. after ah, does not mean complete religious hiberty. It imphies only
that [bose wbo embrace a different religion from [bat endorsed Uy [be
authorities will not be persecuted, and that [he dominant religious par[y
withholds dic power it might command [o repress people of different
See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America. Doeda/us. 96,1 (1967) pp. 1-21.
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religious persuasions. Tbus, apart from [be attitude towards dissenting
hereties, Ihere was a measure of limited toleration in Europe hefore [be
settlement of America. We bave noted [he words of Aquinas, wbo saw [he
Jews as people who, thougb benighted, had a faitb wbich was a pre-echo of
Christianity. He believed of [he Jews [bat, in observing [heir rituals, “ [be
true faith [this is of course Christianity~. was foreshadowed of oíd”>’ Tbe
Jews might therefore be tolerated, in the sense tbat they were not [o be
prohibited in their religious rites. More emphatically in the Islamie world,
specifically in [he Ottoman empire, Jews and Christians were tolerated, and
in tbe millet system [bey were permitted [o create and sustain their own
segregated communities and [o preserve their distinetive cultures.The ghetto
of mediaeval Europe was a not dissirnilar arrangement. In [bese segregated
enclaves, religion was still [he primary affirmation of identity. It provided
dic basis for the establishment of well-demarcated local boundaries between
peoples of different cultures. Those boundaries were based on [be differences
of religious inheritance. But [he example of American pluralism — which
was gradually imitated elsewbere — relegated religion [o a subsidiary role
as an effective marker of major pohitical and cultural boundaries.
Tbere are certain circurnstances in whicb religion may become a
surrogate for other bases for [he alfirmation of identity and dic maintenance
of frontiers between peoples. In particular it may provide a surrogate
national identity. When a country is conquered or invaded, religion may
once again come mio play. The case of ihe ie-ws is obvious. Por many
centuries deprived of a coun[ry. [he Jews often assimilated culturally and
politically [o [be host societies in whicb they lived, What remained to hold
[bern aparí was religion. and thai residue of culture which religion could
sustain. Tbus [be celebrated Cochin Jews and [he Bene Israel communities
in India were almost totally assimilated [o Indian society, and physically
[bose calling [heniselves Jews were indistinguishable from indigenous
Indians — but theJews remained conscious of [heir distinetive identity, and
were able [o do so because tbey had managed, agains[ alí [he odds, [o
preserve at Ieast vestiges of [heir religious ri[es.~
This funetion has not been confined [o [he Jews, even if [bey afford [he
most dramatie instance. A similar role for religion as a form of surrogate
political expression occurred in [he case of Poland in the years of communist
rule, years effectively of Russian dominance in Poland’s affairs. Religion
became a substitute for politics, a basis for the affirmation of Polish identity
lts role in [bis regard was long-established, as [he Poles, hemmed in over [he
long course of history between the Protestant Prussians, the Orthodox
Aquinas, loc. ciÉ.
Sce on tbese communitics, Schitra Strizowcr. Tite Citiláren 0/ Israel: Tite Rece Jsrae/ ot
Bombay, Oxlord: Blackwell, 1971: and idem., Igxoúc Jewish Communities, London: Thomas
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Russians, and the Muslim Turks. found in their Catholicism, an expression in
sacred, transcendental terms of [beir Polishness. Under communism, official
opposition to tbe regime was scarcely permitted, but [he Catholic religion
became [he voice of political dissent. Since the country had no leaders otber
than [bose approved by [he party and, effectively, Uy [be Russians, the only
alterna[ive leaders available were tbe Catbolie clergy. Priests constituted [be
indigenous leadership straturn. They became the symbolic voices of Polisb
identity, andestablished the continuance of a sense of nationality in a context
in which no otber vehiele br sueh expression was available. The eburches
became [he physical centres, [he points of mobilization for [be people in
opposition [o the imposed political cute. Indeed, sucb was [heir popular
aeclaim, [bat many clergy became concerned at the role into which [bey were
being pusbed. and feared that [his development might be a distraction from
[beir fundamental religious purposes.
Tbe lrish case is not altogetber dissimilar. Like otber colonized people,
[bey lacked, over centuries, the opportunity for political expression of
national identity. wben [he natural frontiers which bad existed were
neutralized Uy [he settlement in Ireland of [be dominant British. lrisb culture
and identity could be realized only Uy the people’s persistence in maintaining
a religion different from [bat of [he colonizers. Tbe very strengtb and
conservatism of lrish Catbolicisrn may owe much [o its function as a mark
of differentiation from [be Protestantism (and post-Protestant secularism)
(~i Britain. Because [he gentry and [he landowners were alí of [bern British
— Anglo-¡rish as [bey were called — [he only indigenous leader available
to [be local cornmunity was its priest. The symbolic frontiers of lreland were
[bus maintairied Uy the functioning of the Cburcb, and religicus observance
became a manifest demonstration of Irisb patriotism. Perbaps for [bese
reasoas there has been some resistanee in Ireland Lo the modernizing
tendencies within contemporary Catbolicism. As [be anthropologist Mary
Douglas observed, [he lrish peasant was aggrieved tobe relieved, Uy Vatican
II, of [he obligation not to eat meat on Fridays, because [bis deprived bim
of a syrnbolie gesture tbrough wbicb he asserted not so mucb his Catholicisrn
as his Irisbness.« Greece under Turkisb rule constitutes a similar case.
The foregoing examples are drawn from Catholie and Orthodox instances,
but Protestantism, [00, in certain circumstances. has also helped to reinforce
national and cultural boundaries. In [be United States, br at least a
generation, and sometimes longer, [he original cultural heritage of immigrants
was retained largely througb [be agency of [he immigrant churebes which
continued [o flourish. Thus, [o mention a case we bave alluded [o already, [be
Norwegian Lutheran Cbureb preserved not only Lutberan religion as
Norwegian immigrants remembered it from [heir land of tbeir origin, but it
also acted [o preserve Norwegian culture. Tbe Churcb became tbe only
Mary Douglas. Nau,ral Synibo/s, London: Barrie and Rocklifl. 970. p. 37.
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contexí in which immigran[s could hear and speak [heir native language anó
engage in their original folk customs, maintaining [be Norwegian psychic
frontier long after its members had se[tled into being. or a[ least into
becoming. American citizensi Ihe other national Lutheran churches whcn
transpianted [o America lulfilled prccisely [he same functions. So bound up
werc nationbood and religion in these Protestant countries, that [he case is
recorded for a Swede who, in tha[ overwhdmingly Protestant coun[ry, decided
to become a Roman Catholic. “You canno[ do [haLL urged his friends. “you
cannot do thai — you ~ouid cease tobe a Swede!”
The confusion of national and religious identi[y. and [bus of geograpbic
and cultural frontiers. is nowbere betier and more tragically illustrated than
in [he conteniporary case of Bosnia in particular and tbe former Yugoslavia
in general. There. separate ethnic groupings, claini national identi[y even
though for many decades [bat national identity (as Croats, Serbs,
Montcnegrins. etc.) has been partly submerged in the operation of [he
Yugoslav multi-ethnic s[ate. Despite considerable ethnic inter-mixing. and
the smooth functioning for long periods of highly diversified local
communities, the outbreak of confhict has resuscitated national and ethnic
dreams of independence and difíerentiated destiny. In [he process religious
differcnces have also been called into operation, most specifically in the
case of [be Bosnian Muslims, who are not in origin so much a distinctive
national group, but are rather of similar ethnic origins to [heir Catholic
Croat and Orthodox Serbian neighbours. Wba[ has most particularly
differentiated [hem from Croats or Serbs has been [licir religion. rhe new
frontiers in former Yugoslavia, and particularly in Bosnia-l-lercegovina, if
they are ever drawn, are likely [o be drawn no[ only wi[h ethnic origin in
mmd but also with due regard [o religion. Culture. language, and e[hnicity
(in [he sense of racial, tribal, or national attribution) have become
inextricablv mixed witb religion, and since [his is so, [he sense of identity
of [hese people is virtually solemnized and sacralized by tbat religious
cornponent. The sense of separate identity, which is usuallv also [he sense
of superior idcntity, draws on [bis religious factor, but is undoubtedly further
stimulated by [he fact that [bese peoples co-exis[ in closejuxtaposition with
one another, wi[h no clearly recognized geographical fron[iers, but with
only [bose fron[iers which religiously preserved culture can sustain. These,
[ben, are exceptions [o [he general [rend — a trend for the significance of
religion as a boundary marker to diminish. Bu[ if [he role of religion has
diminished, perhaps [he sanie is true. in most instances, of nationhood.
In general. as nation states have grown bigger and more complex in [heir
structure, a diminution has occurred in [he atavistie atti[udes wbich gaye
risc to raw and unreasoned patriotism and pride in national identi[y. In
See Ni cholas la va cl~i5. Pos/ors ant! ¡tu tuigron iv Y/e Ro/e of u Re/1gb,» E/lic 1,; lIje A /, —
.vorplion of N.’rwegi¿ííí hnmigrants. Ihe l-lague: Nijhoft. 1963.
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consequence, wben modern man has had need [o establish bis sense of
identity, be has had to seek out other agencies Uy whicb [o affirm it. Marx
sought to persuade men [bat [heir identi[y depended on [he situation in
wbicb tbey found themselves in relation [o [he means of production. His
ideological endeavour may be said [o bave failed, since altbougb men
recognized [he irnportance of tbeir relation [o their productive tasks, and
did readily recognize themselves as separated into distinct classes, none [he
less, in everyday life, tbey identified with mueh less abstract entities [han
[he two classes into which Marx sought [o divide humanity.
In [bose ceuntries whicb industrialized carlier, and in whicb freedom
of religious belief prevailed, markedly in Britain, [he United States,
Germany. and tbe nortbern European countries, men did not always find
[beir specific status positions adequate [o give expression [o [heir social
identity. Rehigion was sometimes also called into play. Re different social
classes of those societies showed considerable affinity for particular variants
of religious expression. Wbilst tbere was no uniform correlation between
social status and religious persuasion, [he various denominations within
Christianity, and more especially witbin Protestantism, facilitated in
congenial [erms the manifestation of identity of particular social strata.
These lesser religious frontiers arose witbin [he nation state society,
demarcating unes between people who had a strong belief in [heir own
virtue, and who trans-valuated in religious terms [beir strongsense of [heir
own worthiness. Tbey migbt enjoy relatively little honour in [he social scale.
boL Uy their adoption of a particular religious orientation, and their
affiliation witb a body of like-minded and like-circumstanced fellow beings,
[bey established a sense of identity for themselves and drewtbe boundaries
between [heir own kind and tbe rest of society. Dissenters were everywhere
identified with specific occupations. Rus [be millenarian movements of
pre-Reformation Europe, conspicuously in [he Rheinland and the
Netherlands, were recognized as being lcd by weavers and other
industrialized occupational groups. Re dissenters of seventeenth and
eighteenth century England were artisans and trades people — despised
alike Uy the gentry and [he agricultural classes. Tbe mass revivalism of the
late eigbteenth century under Wesley appealed [o yet lower strata, rniners
and domestie servants being prominent among [be converts [o Methodism.
[<mm [bese diverse expressions of Christian dissenting belief, Ibese obten
newly emerging social strata acquired a sense of iden[ity by affirming, in
tbe face of the hostility of longer establisbed social classes, [beir ultimate
worth in the sigbt of God. in [be process. [bey sometimes acquired not only
the legitimation which they sought but also attitudes of mutual contempt
br other classes, culminating at times in a disposition of beiieving
themselves “bolier [han tbou”. Their sense of apartness was vital [o [beir
sense of iden[ity. By being set over against o[her social strata, Uy building
[he boundarics of their fai[h, [bey affirmed their own identity. Tbeir religion
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transforrned their folk mores into respectable religiously-sanctioned
cus[oms. From it thcy acquired a sense of community, and they learned how
[o organize [hemselves, initially for religious purposes. but eventually also
for industrial unionism, and, in a measure. eventually even for [he pursuit
of political goals.
In [he contemporary world, however, these differences liave diminished.
and [here is less appeal [o religion either for legitimation or asan affirmation
of identity. Tbe integrity of nation s[ates is no longer so readily assumed,
and the oíd nationalism and even nationali[y are taken less and less br
granted, as new supra-national agencies —the United Nations. [he Council
of Europe, the Helsinki Accord, and the European Community, increasingly
intervene in [he affairs of societies [bat nol so long ago would bave brooked
no such incursions across [heir frontiers. Associety has become secularized.
so its institu[ions and agencies have lost their claims [o transcendent
significance, and [he oíd sense of religiously sanctioned local, regional. and
national identity. secure behind well-established frontiers, has dimnied. As
ap~arently fewer people maintain an active belief in (iod’s providence or
in [heir own prospec[s of continuing into an afterlife, so the felt-need for a
rcligious reaffirmation of social identity. or even perhaps of personal
identity. has diminished. Within Chris[iani[y. [he drawing together of
differcnt denominations in [he process of contemporary ecumenism. has
diminished [he distinc[iveness of religious bodies one from another,
including in some measure even [he three major strands of Cbristendom—
Orthodox. Catholic, and Pro[estant. With [he loss of [bat distinctiveness
has also been lost [he capaeity of religion [o reinforce social boundaries
and to sacralize social or personal identi[y.
Inevitably. [here are, in Wes[ern socieíy, sorne exceptions froni [bese
broad generalizations. Ata narrower level, religion may still be mobilized
[o affirm iden[ity and [o establish boundaries between [bose within a
particular religious organization and [bose outside it. In [he instances that
¡ have in mmd, [he religious body itself clairns tobe tbe sole and suflicíent
en[ity to which individual members should relate. It creates its own frontiers
and resisís cvery assault on [hem. 1 refer [o various Christian sects and to
contemporary fundamentalism. The sects existas more or less totalitarian
societies, seeking to encompass the lives of tbeir adherents, and specifying
[he mores and obligations which they must maintain if they are [o continue
in fellowship. The more intense among theni rnay prohibit [heir members
from partieipating in worldly pursuits sueh as dancing, theatre-going, card-
playing. gambling, watching television. and even associating with worldly
people, as well as more obvious taboos on pre-marital sexualitv. Such is
their concern to es[ablish [heir own boundaries, [hat [he sect may require
its young male members [o seek exeniption on grounds of conscience froni
military service, and alí members to seek excusal from service on court
juries. The followers of many sects — Jehovah’s Witncsses. Christadelphians.
Re/igion ant! th.e Affirrn.ation of !denlity 125
and Exclusive Bretbren, among tbem — refuse [o join trades unions, and
rigorously bold themselves aloof from involvement in political elections.
The boundary wbicb tbe sect seeks [o maintain between itself and [he
world isa strong frontier. The sectarian acquires his entire sense of identity
primarily. andas nearly as possible exclusively, from his religious affiliation.
llis age, occupation, edueation, social status, nationality, or ethnic group
are alí of little consequence compared [o bis religious commitment. Tbe
Jehovab’s Witness is a Witness first and foremost, before be is a factory
worker, a Londoner, a British citizen, a West Indian immigrant. oc anything
cisc in terms of wbicb he might be identified. AII otber involvements are
kept [o an absolute minimum in [he interests of fulfilling bis voluntary
religious obligations. Religion can sustain [bese frontiers, at least for
relatively small minorities who. howevcr, eollectively may number millions
of people world-wide. Tbe cost, of course, is that alí otber frontiers, alí other
sources of identity, values, interests. and recreations and bobbies are
relinquished in favour of [hose tha[ are pan of [he prcscriptions of [be sect
tse1 f.
My examples of religion as an agency of boundary-maintenance have
been cbiefly drawn from religions of theJudeo-Cbristian-lslamic tradition.
Wc might ask whether other religious traditions function in anything like
[he same way [o affirm identity and [o sustain cultural distinctiveness. Tbe
answer must be tha[ tbey do sometimes and to some extent. but perhaps
less consisten[ly than has been [he case with [bese religions of middle
eas[ern provenance. Tbe contemporary evidence froni India indicates,
particularly in tbe rise of certain species of Hindu fundamentalism, tbat
Hinduism migbt also be mobilized [o reinforce cultural frontiers.
Traditionally. Hinduism legitimized, and its priestly stratum may bave
indeed created, powerful internal divisions witbin traditional Indian society,
as exemplified by the rigid frontiers of [he caste system. Here were virtually
impermeable barriers between social groups, sacralized Uy a pervasive belief
system. and cemented Uy a system of occupational succession and [be virtual
prohibilion of any sort of social mobility. In [he modern setting, [he capacity
of Hinduism [o aftirm national identity may itself have been sbarpened and
intensified bv its co-existence alongside a vigorous rival. Islam. As a
voluntanistic, proselytizing religion, Islam may always be seen as a potent
threat [o an ethnically-based, hence non-proselytizing religion like
Hin du is ni
Elsewhere, where religions operate side-by-side, and maintain some
type of symbiotic relationship, such as oceurs between most Buddhist
movements and Shintoism in Japan, neitber religion can claim solely [o
establish frontiers and reaffirm Japanese identity. Together, however, they
may indeed do so, and both faiths play a part in [he maintenance of that
uniqueness of Japanese culture wbich so mucb preoccupies [be Japanese.
and from whicb tbey do derive a s[rong sense of [beir difference from otber
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peoples. For centuries, Japan closed its external frontiers, and isolated itself
from almost alí externa? influences. In sucb a situation, the need for religion
[o reinforce frontiers was perhaps scarcely necessary. Japanese religion, in
[bose circumstances. eertainly shared with otber features of Japanese
culture. an inheritance of a distinetive and peculiar kind.
The pre-eminence of Cbristianity among frontier-reinforcing religions
5 perbaps primarily due [o [he combination of features which we noticed
at [he beginning of [bis paper: rigorous exclusivism and [he commitmen[ o
proselytize. These elemenis in [he carly Church put [he Christian elemenl
ofidentity ata premium, and it Ls exactly [his empbasis which characterizes
modern sectarianism. Whils[ for [he vast majority of Cbristians in [be
modern West, religion is no longer a crucial point confirming social identi[y,
for the early Christians it was, and for contemporary sec[arians. it remains,
in its own wav. tbe Last —and [he first— frontier.
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